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Durkheimian and Spencerian Sociology of Institutions and Institutional Analysis

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“That is what is most essential about the notion of social constraint: all that it implies is that collective ways of acting or thinking possess a reality outside the individuals who, at any moment in time, conform to it. They are things which have their own existence. The individual encounters them already formed and he can do nothing to eliminate them or to change them... Certainly the individual plays a role in their creation. But for a social fact to exist, several individuals, at the very least, must have interacted together, and this joint action must have resulted in a new product... we can, in fact, call all beliefs and all modes of behaviour instituted by the collectivity ‘institutions’... Social facts exist only where there are distinct organizations (Durkheim, [1895]1985: 67-9).”

“One contains only states that are personal to each one of us, our individual characteristics, whilst the other consists of states which are common throughout society... From this there results a solidarity *sui generis* which, deriving from the shared characteristics, directly links the individual to society (Durkheim, [1893]1933: 105-6).”

It has been a key question in the discipline of sociology from the outset how the society is differentiated along with the division of labor but how it holds together. Among founding fathers of sociology, Durkheim struggled to explain system differentiation and its integration under the influence of evolutionary and functional thinking prevalent in the social sciences at the end of nineteenth century. Regarding this, Spencer was one of leading scholars to whom Durkheim owed much. This is why Spencer has been a useful reference whenever one wants to evaluate Durkheim’s thoughts. Particularly concerning Durkheim’s sociology of institutions, it is unavoidable to discuss Spencer as well for the purpose of comparing, contrasting, or clarifying issues. My argument is, however, that, even though it seems that there is a little difference between them as far as differentiation alone is concerned, it is not the case with how the society is possible in terms of integration given

the increase of differentiation. Hence, my position is quite different from Turner's assessment of Durkheim's sociology because Turner has consistently contended that Durkheim provided similar propositions on differentiation of the society and its integration as Spencer did. He noted some differences between them (e.g., Durkheim's contribution to 'interactionist theorizing (Turner, 2002)'), but they are not a big deal. This conclusion is mostly due to his preference for the system (dynamics) approach I would like to call. Directing attention to Durkheim's ideas of crystallization, collective representation, and collective effervescence, I could realize that Durkheim grew out of Spencer's system thinking to move onto the sociology of 'emergence' (i.e., bottom-up)¹. Arguably, Durkheim's sociology of institutions should be understood in this context. Specifically, given that Durkheim considered sociology as 'the science of (social) institutions²,' I will discuss how differently Durkheim came to understand the relationship of two core institutions, religion and polity, in this writing.

Few would hesitate to praise Turner, vis-à-vis other scholars such as Giddens, Coser, Alexander, Collins, and Ritzer who have written texts on the 'history' of sociological theories or 'thoughts,' for his significant contribution to extracting sociologists' core ideas and formulating them in the form of causal diagrams under the banner of theory construction. For this reason, how Turner has interpreted Durkheim's main arguments with the reference to Spencer is a good departure for discussion. And then, I will present how Turner's understanding of them dovetails with his own theory of institutions. Before

¹ Sawyer (2002: 244-5) summarized them as follows: 1) the crystallization of social phenomena from social currents; 2) the historical emergence of a social stage from a social milieu; 3) the emergence of collective representation from the social milieu; 4) the emergence of 'second degree' collective representations from those that originally emerged from the social milieu; 5) the emergence of larger social groups from combinations of smaller groups; and 6) the emergence of 'secondary groups' from the interaction of individuals with those first-order emergent societies.

² This definition of sociology is not exclusive, although he analyzed family, corporations, professional bodies, and education. He divides the principal divisions of sociology into social morphology, social physiology, general sociology, and so forth in Durkheim [1903](1994).

reinterpreting Durkheim's ideas of institutions, it is a necessary step to recall how Turner replies to the critiques of functionalist approaches in institutional analysis. Accepting some of them, albeit not fully, Turner began to use the terms, 'power' or 'force,' more frequently than 'function' on the one hand and emphasized 'causal' mechanisms on the other. Besides, he acknowledges valuable contribution of rational choice theory to our understanding of how to explain the emergence of institutions. Nonetheless, he contends that the concept of selection pressure "can be expanded to reconcile agent-based and functional theories of institutional development (Turner, 2003: 19)."

"The basic critique of all functional arguments is that they do not specify how human agents create social institutions... While the critique is typically overdrawn, it has some merit. Among the various criticisms that can be summarized, let me focus on the one developed by rational choice theorists (e.g. Hechter, Coleman) who seek to explain institutions as the outcomes of decision-making processes of rational actors... The logic of this argument is often juxtaposed to that of functionalism and seen as a superior form of explanation because it provides a mechanism by which problems and pressures translate into actions that generate and sustain institutional systems. It is possible, I believe, to mediate between these logics; and the key is the concept of *selection pressure* (Turner, 2003: 14-15. Emphasis is original)."

There will be no objection to the view that "Spencer and Durkheim were addressing the same set of related theoretical questions, first given expression by Adam Smith... 1) what general conditions cause the degree of social differentiation in a social system to increase; and 2) what processes operate to integrate the units in a differentiating social system (Turner, 1984: 23)." Thanking to both of them for providing valuable ideas about selection mechanisms, Turner recently formulated two different mechanisms: Durkheimian version and Spencerian version. He argued that one could find out two sorts of selection pressures in Spencer's arguments, unlike Durkheim's. "First-order selection pressures emerge with problems of adaptation to the external environment of a population. The source of these pressures can come from the physical and biotic environments as well as the sociocultural systems of another population... Second-order selection comes from the sociocultural environments created by the growing complexity of society itself... These kinds of

selection pressures come from inside the society as a result of its increasing differentiation and complexity (Turner, 2003: 19).³”

In spite of those differences between Durkheim and Spencer, Turner’s overall assessment has been very consistent since his earlier articles. First, Durkheim, like Spencer, was another pioneer of evolutionary and functional theorizing. “Durkheim’s causal analysis of differentiation is *essentially the same* with Spencer’s, except that it emphasizes only one causal process: competition among units increases the selection pressures for differentiation. It adds nothing new to Spencer’s model (Turner, 1984: 28. Emphasis is mine).” Push this conclusion further, Turner asserted that Durkheim was a loyal follower of Spencer: “Another point of emphasis in Spencer’s work, but one that was *more fully developed* Emile Durkheim twenty years later in 1893, is the Darwinian analogy: Social differentiation, or ‘social speciation’... Durkheim made the connection between the Darwinian idea of evolution by natural selection and societal evolution *more explicit* than Spencer (Turner, 1998: 81-2. Emphasis is mine).”

I do not intend to add more to the prevalent view that the differentiation of the society and its integration was an entry point for Durkheim. It was the case with Spencer, needless to say. Furthermore, Durkheim recognized that “there are an ever-decreasing number of collective beliefs and sentiments which are both sufficiently collective and strong to assume a religious character (Durkheim, [1893]1933: 49) ⁴.” Recall that, for Spencer,

³ This is why the causal diagram (“Spencer’s Selectionist Argument”) in Figure 1.3 (p.18), unlike another diagram (“Durkheim’s Adaptation of Darwin’s Logic”) in Figure 1.2 (p.17), has a feed-back loop of the second-order selection from “Differentiation of a Population” through “New Problems from Internal Environment of a Population” to “Increased Logistical Loads on a Population.” Also, Spencer has a less optimistic view that “competition would lead to specialization of individuals in ever more diverse resource niches instead of their extinction (Ibid: 16),” as is implied in the famous phrase, survival of the fittest.

⁴ “The degree of value generalization among members of a population is a positive function of the degree of structural differentiation of that population (Turner, 1984: 25).” This proposition of his implies that “differentiating systems inevitably produce generalized

“differentiation always creates problems of integration, coordination, and control of larger numbers of distinctive units, especially because common cultural symbols... can no longer have the same salience for diverse units operating in distinctive environments (Turner, 1985: 66).” This is why Durkheim had tried to find out alternative modes of integration, given the irreversible trend Spencer noticed earlier that common cultural symbols are on the wane. As Lukes (1973) summarized, this issue comes down to “if pre-industrial societies were held together by common ideas and sentiments, and shared norms and values, what holds an industrial society together?”

What solutions did Durkheim and Spencer provide to how social integration is possible, then? For Spencer, the degree of social integration depends on two factors: 1) the degree of centralization of political powers and 2) the degree of functional interdependence of differentiated units. “Such integrative problems can lead to dissolution of the social mass if they cannot be resolved through the consolidation and centralization of political power as well as through the development of a system of mutual interdependencies of differentiated units (Turner, 1985: 66).” In my view, Spencer did not fully develop his basic ideas of integration, however. Why? First, it was the cycle of centralization and resistance⁵ that appealed him strongly. Also, he must have a more optimistic view on ‘organic’ solidarity based on a system composed of mutually interrelated units. It will be able to replace ‘mechanical solidarity.’

In spite of his overall system thinking, it should be noticed that Spencer was concerned with the micro processes of interaction that sustain the institutional order, but a much less extent compared to Durkheim as I will discuss it in detail later. According to Turner (1985: 116),

values, and in the process, weaken the major integrating force (i.e., mechanical solidarity) in less differentiated systems (Turner, 1984: 28).”

⁵ In this regard, Spencer and Pareto, from the perspective of the system dynamics, share a similar view on the cyclic pattern of political power’s centralization, as Turner shortly touched. For how to model Pareto’s system thinking, see Powers and Hanneman (1983) and Hanneman (1988: 287-290).

“Spencer saw ceremonies as *‘pre-institutional’* in that other institutional structures evolve out of primordial ceremonial practices. The seeds of other institutions, particularly government and religion, are found in the basic ceremonial activities of early humans. Indeed, it is in the stylized interactions, rituals, badges, forms of address, and other ceremonial actions that regulation and control of people in simple societies is achieved (Emphasis is mine).”

Even though ceremonial control is the interactive basis of the macro institutional order, Spencer argued, however, that as political, religious, and economic structures develop, there is a corresponding ‘decay’ and ‘reduction’ of ceremonial control (Turner, 1985: 117). In sum, borrowing Durkheim’s terms, Spencer’s view was that ceremonial control as ‘mechanical’ solidarity which is effective only in simple societies (i.e., ‘rude societies’ in Spencer’s term or ‘archaic societies’ in Durkheim’s term) would be replaced by ‘organic’ solidarity in more complex societies with interdependent units. Focusing particularly on the interplay between polity and religion, Spencer conceived it as “the symbiotic relationship between church and state (Turner, 1985: 140)” in terms of their functions. “Religious structures promote social integration through 1) reinforcing cultural values and beliefs by imbuing them with the power of supernatural forces and 2) strengthening social structural patterns, especially those revolving around power and inequality, by making them seem to be extensions of the supernatural will (Turner, 1985: 137).”

I will bring up how Durkheim began to reconceptualize the issue of integration soon, but suffice to say here that it is the very place he departed from Spencer’s view (i.e., institutional systems operate at the macro level) to start another intellectual journey of theorizing institutions: as Durkheim made a distinction between institutions as systems and institutionalization, the emphasis was shifted more towards the roles of interpersonal interactions in institutionalization processes in a phenomenological sense⁶. Recalling

⁶ Turner (1986b. Except in this article, he did not use the term, institutionalization, when discussing Spencer) maintained that Spencer devoted his attention to ‘institutionalization processes’ as ‘short-term processes of structuring’ in social systems, but it should be noted

Giddens's concept of 'structuration,' my argument is that Durkheim's sociology of institutions should be understood in his emphasis on generative mechanisms, as is implied in his drawing a line between functional analysis and casual analysis⁷.

Turner (1981a) divided Durkheim's theoretical principles into three: 1) social system differentiation; 2) system integration, and 3) system disintegration given that Durkheim always concerned himself with "what are the basic integrative, and disintegrative, properties in differentiating social systems (Turner, 1981a: 382).⁸" As Turner (1981a, 384-5) summarized, there are a variety of definitions of system integration in Durkheim's works: 1) individual passions are regulated by shared cultural symbols (*The Division of Labor in Society* and *Suicide*); 2) individuals are attached to the social collective through rituals and mutually reinforcing gestures (*Suicide* and *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*); 3) actions are regulated and coordinated by norms as well as legitimated political structures (*The Division of Labor in Society*); and 4) inequalities are considered legitimate and to correspond to the distribution of talents (*The Division of Labor in Society*). Turner

that what he called as institutionalization refers to: "For Spencer, the process of institutionalization involves growth in the size of a population, its differentiation, its integration, and finally, its adaptive upgrading. (Turner, 1986b: 661-2)."

⁷ Because of the limit of space, I cannot spend more pages on Perrin's interpretation of Durkheim and Spencer, but he might not agree with both Turner and me. He finds out similarities between Durkheim and Spencer Turner did not notice, which is against my emphasis on their divergent views. For example, Spencer frequently stressed that institutions arise not by design but by incidental growth (Perrin, 1975). It should be noticed that Spencer discussed the concept of unintended consequences. Next, Spencer conceptualized evolution in four different ways and 'the survival of the fittest' might oversimplify his complicated view of sociocultural evolution. Also, Spencer, like Durkheim, made a distinction between functional analysis and causal analysis. Another, Spencer, like Durkheim, has 'consistently' emphasized the microfoundations of social integration even in complex societies (i.e., rituals, ceremonies). See Perrin (1975, 1976, 1995).

⁸ "The key to understanding Durkheim's view of integration, then, is the inherent relationship between differentiation of roles and the increasing generality of moral evaluational systems. For as evaluational symbols such as values, beliefs, and religious dogmas become general and abstract, the major basis for integration in comparatively undifferentiated systems is undone. It 'must' be replaced by alternative bases of integration (Turner, 1981a: 385-6)."

finally formulated Durkheim's arguments as follows: The higher level of integration in a differentiated population, the higher degree of 1) intra- and inter-group normative regulation and coordination; 2) subgroup formation around diverse productive activities; 3) coordination vested in a centralized authority; 4) organized opposition to centralized authority; 5) the correspondence between the unequal distribution of scarce resources and the unequal distribution of talents; and 6) restitutiveness of sanctions (Turner, 1981a: 386). However, one could realize that Turner derived these propositions only from *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) and *Preface to the Second Edition* (1904). In other words, Durkheim's account of social solidarity in *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* is not included in Turner's final formulation: "Even as Durkheim (1912, 1922; *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, *Moral Education*, respectively) sought to understand social psychological processes, his sociologicistic position on integration remained unchanged (Turner, 1981a: 389)."

I do not intend argue here that Turner did disregard Durkheim's theory of social interactions. First, Turner (2002: 19) is well cognizant that Durkheim became more interested in examining the interpersonal dynamics that create and sustain the collective conscience and that, as a consequence, maintain sociocultural arrangements in society⁹. Turner also acknowledged his intellectual inclination toward macro-dynamics on his earlier career by qualifying "these more micro dimensions of Durkheim's theory are well-stated by Collins¹⁰ and are not presented in this analysis, which examines the more macro

⁹ See the following: "The flow of interaction and its relationship to culture and social structure are, in Durkheim's model, determined by the emotional feelings that develop among individuals, their ability to represent these sentiments in objects, and their capacity to enact rituals that arouse the emotions associated with these sentiments. Durkheim saw this process as the origin of religion (Turner, 2002: 21)."

¹⁰ As it is well known, Collins's model of interaction ritual chains is to combine Durkheim's ideas of interpersonal interactions with Goffman's ethnomethodology and dramaturgy. According to Collins (1988: 192), an interaction ritual is a kind of energy-producing machine and a social battery for charging up individuals. What is more important in my writing, however, is that Collins with Hanneman (1998) tried to test his model from the system dynamics perspective which is far from Durkheim's ideas of the emergence of

dimensions of Durkheim's theory (Turner, 1981a: 389)." Nevertheless, Turner's overall evaluation of Durkheim's ideas of integration is based on system thinking in which institutions are located at the macro level and they are embedded in each other to constitute institutional systems. Not surprisingly, his interpretation of Durkheim is consistent with Turner's own theory of institutions: "At the macrolevel of reality, institutions are the essential structures... Institutions are generated, sustained, and changed by population, production, reproduction, regulation, and distribution (Turner, 2003: 5-7. See also Figure 1.1)¹¹."

collective consciousness (i.e., agent-based modeling). For example, Fantasia (1988), although he did not mention Durkheim, proposed the concept of 'cultures of solidarity' to regard class consciousness as collective effervescence which can be generated as the outcome of interactions among workers. No wonder, he is critical of Wright's approach based on the survey and quantitative analysis which "may capture some important attitudinal trends, but crucial dynamics of collective interaction are lost, and thus what is being measured may not represent the collective class consciousness that studies purport to show (Fantasia 1988: 7)." I do not want to say that Durkheim viewed the society as an adaptive complex system in the contemporary sense of complexity theory (But, see Luhmann (1982)). Nonetheless, he conceived emergent properties as unintended consequences which move in an unexpected way like the phase transition at a tipping point. I do not intend to argue that Collins and Hanneman's approach is wrong, however. Right! Because Durkheim's concept of social milieu, for instance, refers to basic properties of social network of a given group (e.g., dynamic density, degree of concentration, and so on in Durkheim's terms), as Sawyer (2002) pointed out. For this reason, Sawyer did not notice that Durkheim's sociology has implications for both system dynamics modeling and agent-based modeling. Turning attention to another substantive implication rather than methodological one, Emirbayer's interpretation is interesting. He (1996) contends that Durkheim tried to explain how both socio-structural mechanisms (i.e., network patterns of social relations that comprise an interpersonal setting of actions) and social-psychological mechanisms (i.e., psychological structures that constrain and enable action by channeling flows and investments of emotional energy) are connected to operate in (de)institutionalization processes. Suffice to say here that collective action (i.e., social movements) is main concern for Durkheim, as I will discuss it later.

¹¹ He continued to claim that "institutions and their corresponding systems of cultural values, ideologies, and norms allow populations as a whole to adapt to the environment, both the biophysical and sociocultural. Macrolevel analysis will, therefore, revolve around developing theories about the forces that drive the formation of institutional systems... Institutional analysis is, therefore, inherently evolutionary because it explores how humans create population-wide structures and cultural systems that enable them to survive in the environment, often an environment of their own making (Turner, 2003: 5)." Meanwhile, the

However, I cannot overemphasize that Durkheim had begun to stay away from Spencer's system approach which is related to the structural functionalist view on institutions at the macro level. But, since when and why? In my view, it was in "The Rules of Sociological Method" that Durkheim first tried to conceptualize institutionalization and deinstitutionalization (i.e. defying institutionalization) while differentiating institutionalized social facts and another sort of social facts, social currents he called¹²: "Since the examples just cited all consist of established beliefs and practices, one might think, as a result of what has been said, that social facts exist only where there are distinct organizations. But there are other facts which, without appearing in these highly crystallized forms, have the same objectivity and the same influence over the individual. These are what are called 'social currents' (Durkheim, [1895]1985: 69-70)." It should be noted here that Durkheim believed around this period, as Sawyer (2002: 240) pointed out, that the only scientific methodology available to sociology was to study institutionalized (or materialized) social facts. In other words, he could not conceive of a scientific method that would allow him to study social currents.

key locus of 'differentiation' is at the 'meso' level where there are two types of generic structures, corporate units (e.g., corporations, cities, and so forth) - in which activities are organized for the pursuit of ends or goals - and categorical units (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, class, and so forth) - which distinguish individuals in terms of certain characteristics: "Differentiation of corporate and categorical units is a driving force of mesoreality. When humans organize activities, they do so along with two basic lines of differentiation: formation of corporate and categorical units... Differentiation forces generating corporate and categorical units will set into motion integration forces that will work to order relations within and between these units. (Turner and Boyns, 2001: 362-3)." Following Blau and Hawley, he named segmentation, 'differentiation,' and 'integration' as meso-level forces. Suffice to point out here that 'differentiation' at the meso level is not the same with institutional 'differentiation' at the macro level in his usage. Also, it should be noted that Turner made a distinction between 'regulation' at the macro level and 'integration' at the meso level.

¹² Furthermore, Durkheim asserted that social currents each participant feels in the public meeting are emergent properties of social encounters: "Thus, in a public meeting, the great waves of enthusiasm, indignation and pity that are produced, have as their origin no single individual consciousness. They come to each of us from outside and are likely to sweep us along despite ourselves (Durkheim, [1895]1985: 70)."

It is apparent that Durkheim began to put more thoughts on (de)institutionalization in ‘The Rules of Sociological Method,’ but it is in his another masterpiece, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, that Durkheim he finally and interestingly enough contended that “it may be said that *nearly all the great social institutions have been born in religion* (Durkheim, [1912]1947: 127. Emphasis is mine).” This is why Durkheim told: “It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view of the essential role played by religion in social life... This was a revelation to me. That course on the sociology of religion in 1895 marked a dividing line in the development of my thought, to such an extent that all my previous studies had to be taken up afresh in order to be made to harmonize with these new insights (Quoted from Therborn, 1976: 257)¹³.” For this reason, I could not agree more with Coser’s statement of Durkheim’s turning point: “Though Durkheim stressed that in modern societies a measure of integration was achieved through the intermeshing and mutual dependence of differentiated roles, he came to see that these societies nevertheless could not do without some common integration by a system of common beliefs... Hence Durkheim turned, in the last period of his scholarly life, to the study of religious phenomena as core elements of systems of common beliefs (Coser, 1971: 136).”

What stands out in particular about Durkheim’s approach is, as Crow (2002: 13) pointed out, his identification of two complementary ways in which individuals come to be socialized, one involving regulation of behavior through institutional controls and the other involving integration of individuals through their shared experience of interaction¹⁴. Truly, Durkheim regarded the state as a regulator of the society at his earlier career in the similar way Spencer did. Durkheim “identifies the secular political order as the vehicle through which a new basis of regulation could emerge to reestablish a consensual order in the face

¹³ The Original source is ‘Jugemnets de valeurs’ in *Sociologie et philosophie* (p.140f).

¹⁴ In this way, social integration for Durkheim finally has two distinct meanings. For this reason, it still seems to me that even when Turner mentions the concept of integration in Durkheim’s thought, what Turner does really mean is sometimes closer to regulation at the macro level to integration at the meso-level.

of the declining religious basis of authority (Prager, 1981: 929).” The paradox here is, however, that Durkheim, while recognizing the declining religious basis of political authority, laid another foundation for political sociology in the middle of investigating religious phenomena. The conclusions Durkheim came to after his observation of the religious ceremony in several primitive societies were: “There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies and meetings where the individuals, being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments.” (Durkheim, [1912]1947: 131-2)¹⁵

To understand why his turning point is so critical, first of all, we have to try to get the hang of what is the essence of his political sociology generally and what it means by democracy particularly. First, it should be realized that Durkheim did not regard political sociology as one of branches in sociology (See Durkheim [1904]1994). Neither did he use that term, political sociology. Also, he prefers the term, ‘moral authority,’ to authority or domination, unlike Weber. As Nisbet (1965) convincingly proposed, one key concept in Durkheim’s political sociology is moral integration, which is quite consistent with his effort to incorporate the issue of democracy in his ‘science of ethics.’ Besides moral integration and solidarity, I would like to stress that communication between the ruler and the ruled was another main issue for Durkheim’s political sociology: “Communications between the State and other parts of society are many, and both regular and organized... This is really the gist of democracy (Durkheim, [1904-1912]1958: 85-6).”

¹⁵ See also the following: “Religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities. The rites are a manner of acting which takes rise in the midst of the assembled groups and which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups.” (Durkheim, [1912]1947: 118)

One might ask: Why did Durkheim think that religious ceremonies are related to the political, then? What is his new understanding of the relationship between polity and religion? To answer to these thorny questions, it is necessary to understand why Durkheim came to the conclusion that organic solidarity is not enough. In my view, Durkheim conceptualized the division of labor in more sophisticated way than Spencer did, even though he did not analyze fully the anomic division of labor and the forced division of labor. For instance, Durkheim differentiated a positive social link from a negative one. The negative form of (organic) solidarity appears when the interaction among people is mediated by the things such as market economy and bureaucracy which are less bounded (embedded!) in the interpersonal relations¹⁶. This is why he, unlike Spencer, could not have an optimistic view on how much of social integration organic solidarity will be able to enhance. He began to seek alternative sources of solidarity within the ‘civil society.’

Civil society has been located in the center of Durkheim’s sociology (of institutions). This is why Emirbayer evaluates that Durkheim provided “a useful corrective to those who would devote themselves primarily to the study of capitalist development and/or state formation (e.g. Marx, Weber) (Emirbayer, 1996: 113).” Regarding this issue, I do not deny that the concept of civil society is still elusive ontologically and epistemologically although it, vis-à-vis the polity (political science) and the economy (economics), has been the center of attention since the birth of sociology as a discipline. However, just recall that political economy became the science of civil society for Marx, finally. Prager (1981) contended

¹⁶ “The negative relation which may serve as a type for the others is the one which unites the thing to the person... The jurists distinguish two kinds of rights: to one they give the name real; to the other, that of personal... it (organic solidarity in the negative form) directly links things to persons, but not persons among themselves... Consequently, since it is only through the medium of persons that things are integrated in society, the solidarity resulting from this integration is wholly negative.” (Durkheim, [1893]1933: 115-6) Let me introduce another paragraph. “The rules relative to real rights and to personal relations which are established in their turn form a definite system which has as its function, not to attach different parts of society to one another, but, on the contrary, to put them outside one another, to mark cleanly the barriers which separate them. They do not correspond to a positive social link. It is not a true solidarity, having its own existence and its special nature, but rather the negative side of every species of solidarity.” (Durkheim, [1893]1933: 119-20)

that, for similar reasons Emirbayer addressed above, Weber's political sociology is a formal theory of democracy compared to Durkheim's (i.e., His political sociology is quite related to some other traditions such as French anarchism, 'associative democracy' or 'communitarism.')

In my view, sociology of religion is the science of civil society for Durkheim¹⁷.

Does this mean that Durkheim fell back from organic solidarity to mechanical solidarity? I would like to rekindle attention to 'the reversal of Durkheim's argument' Nisbet called: Durkheim never went back, in later studies, to any utilization of the distinction between the two types of solidarity, nor to the division of labor as a form of cohesion:

"The kinds of society, constraint, and solidarity dealt with in all his later works – either in theoretical or practical terms – have nothing whatsoever to do with the attributes that he had laid down for an organic and (presumably) irreversibly modern society in *The Division of Labor*. On the contrary, society – in all its guises, functions, and historical roles – becomes, for him, a compound of social and psychological elements that he had first relegated to folk or primitive society (Nisbet, 1965: 37)."

Marks (1974) interpreted in a similar way to provide an interesting view that Durkheim's sociology of religion was the last solution to anomie since Durkheim judged that all of solutions (i.e., occupational, political, and educational projects) were not that successful. In *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, "*nomic processes can no longer be called mechanical*, even with regard to these homogeneous Austrian societies. Society is seen here to be an 'active cooperation' (Marks, 1974: 353-4. Emphasis is mine)." Regarding how social solidarity can be generated within civil society (i.e., the public sphere I would like to call following Habermas), collective effervescence Durkheim found out was an alternative,

¹⁷ Here, I would like to point out that civil society might be regarded as one example of corporate units (like communities) in Turner's framework. In other words, his analysis of institutional systems cannot capture the substantive but complicated meanings of civil society (e.g., What does it mean by the embeddedness of the economy in society in Polanyi's term? Why is it so important?).

which is closer to mechanical solidarity but neither mechanical one nor organic one, exactly saying.

“There are periods in history when, under the influence of some great collective shock, social interactions have become much more frequent and active. Men look for each other and assemble together more than ever. That general effervescence results which is characteristic of revolutionary or creative epochs (Durkheim, [1912]1947: 124).”

“A day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formula are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity (Durkheim, [1912]1947: 427).”

This is why Marks (Ibid: 358) called Durkheim’s last solution to social integration and solidarity ‘popular movement approach¹⁸.’ Durkheim, unlike outstanding scholars at the 19th century, came to perceive the crowd as a group of people who will be able to create new ideals for the foundation of new institutions and a political place for communication where they experience life itself through activated interrelationship. Again, Crucial to Durkheim’s theory of religion as socially determined was his claim that certain social situations, those of ‘collective effervescence’, generate and recreate religious beliefs and sentiments. In advancing it, Durkheim was doubtless affected by the crop of studies in crowd psychology that had appeared at the end of the nineteenth century, by Scipio Sighele, Gustave Le Bon and, indeed, Gabriel Tarde among others, but there is no evidence that he was specifically influenced by any of them; and, unlike them, he did not see crowd behavior as pathological, undesirable, and an argument against democracy. On the contrary, he argued that it was ‘out of this effervescence itself that the religious idea seems to be

¹⁸ However, Marks(Ibid: 356) assessed Durkheim’s popular movement theory as unsuccessful. According to him, while Durkheim claimed that the primitive concentrations seemed to be occasioned by ‘periodical variations of nature’, he could not find any such easy formula for the would-be occasions of modern concentrations. The best that he could do was to make very general remarks about various possibilities. In any event, Durkheim was unable to specify the initial occasion for the creation of ‘new gods’ other than to speak abstractly about ‘moments of collective ferment,’ so his discussion of how these putative new ideals might be reaffirmed is rather hollow.

born', that 'after a collective effervescence men believe themselves transported into an entirely different world from the one they have before their eyes', that sacred beings, the creation of collective thought, 'attain their greatest intensity at the moment when the men are assembled together and are in immediate relations with one another, when they all partake of the same idea and the same sentiment' (Lukes, 1973: 462-3).

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